Connect with us

Analysis

Barcelona vs Bayern: what went wrong?

Lewis Shankie

Published

on

Header Image by Manu Fernández / Pool via Getty Images

After the humiliation of losing 2–8 in the Champions League, the club has hit rock bottom. For the third year in a row Barça embarrassed themselves. As painful as it may seem, it is important to understand what went wrong on Friday night as Barcelona totally collapsed against Bayern Munich.


Following the worst defeat in the club’s history, there must be significant changes, and quickly. The Barcelona vs Bayern Munich showed one team that were completely lost and another that is doing things right. There was a clear lack of leadership from the Catalans and a management that was completely out of its depth. Many players proved that they are not at the level to be playing for the Spanish giants.

The game also highlighted that there are much deeper problems at the club than just poor performances on the pitch. Financial troubles, an incompetent board, reckless spending, midtable managers and awful squad planning are just some of the issues behind the scenes.

Disaster against Bayern

When the line-up was announced, many fans’ fears had come true. Quique Setién had abandoned his principles and chosen a team that proved he is not brave enough to manage the blaugranas. He tried to set up defensively with four in midfield. This meant Arturo Vidal often playing behind the front two and Sergi Roberto in right midfield.

It evidently did not work and resulted in the midfield completely collapsing in both defending and attacking. They could not keep the ball and gave in to Bayern’s pressing while also being unable to win the ball back. Nélson Semedo and Roberto were hopeless on the right-hand side and simply did not have any understanding between them. This led to most of the Bavarians success coming from Barça’s right flank.

Nélson Semedo Ivan Perišić Barcelona Bayern wrong

That the game was lost in the flanks when that obviously was Bayern’s main threat hints at the poor tactics chosen | Photo by UEFA / Handout via Xinhua

In defence, it was simply embarrassing. To concede eight goals is unacceptable. The full-backs have been a problem at the Catalan side for years now and change is needed in this position. Clément Lenglet and Gerard Piqué just gave up as both are experienced enough to do better. Marc-André ter Stegen also had a miserable night. His passing let him down and he should have done better with a few of the goals.

One of the most concerning issues is the team’s mentality. They looked beaten after the third goal went in. There was no leadership, no confidence and every player just hid. This has come from too many players hiding behind Lionel Messi carrying them for seasons now. The team desperately needs to be freshened up as most of the heavyweights have become comfortable and lost their competitiveness.

Quique Setién

When Quique Setién was appointed he sold fans a dream of returning great football back to the Camp Nou. He was going to reinstate Johan Cruyff’s style and give priority to the youth players. However, Quique did not live up to this. The clash against Bayern showed that Setién does not have the personality, strength or ability to manage Barça. He went for a defensive formation and conceded eight goals. This is not Cruyff football.

Again, he only made two out of the five available substitutions. He brought Antoine Griezmann on at half time when the Messi, Luis Suárez and Griezmann trio had only worked once this season, against Villarreal. Moreover, he substituted Ansu Fati on and it looked like he was told to play through the middle. Barcelona needed width in the team and pace upfront which Setién still has not learned. He did nothing to try and fix the result.

“I like my team to play well, that’s the only way I can go home happy. If we win 1–0 undeservedly, I will be happy with the three points but I will go home annoyed because what you need is to feel good and do things properly. If you do it well, you will always have more chance of winning”

Quique Setién
in his first press conference as a Barça manager

From start to finish, his six months in charge have raised more questions than answered. Quique failed to compete in any competition and made the exact same mistakes as Ernesto Valverde. His substitutions were bizarre as he seemed to forget he could make any until the 80th minute in most matches. Furthermore, he did not have the courage to drop those who were under performing and replace them with younger players. It has been a sad end to his short term in charge after promising so much at the beginning.

The bigger picture

For years Barça’s demise has been clear because of one man: Josep Maria Bartomeu. During his time, president Bartomeu has taken the joy from the club and permanently scared it. The Bayern match showed just how broken the club has become during his time. At the start, there were happy sensations projected by the board to make it seem that all was well, this was an illusion. Under Bartomeu’s leadership, Barça has lost its identity and spirit.

The current president is part of a growing trend of football club owners that do not care about football and are only in it for business reasons. What makes Bartomeu stand out is that he does not understand business either. He has financially ruined the club with shady deals. No club has spent more money over the last decade or has a higher wage bill than Barcelona.

What has the club got to show for it? The oldest starting eleven the azulgranas have ever fielded in the Champions League. Three of the most expensive signings in their history costing nearly €500 million combined that have failed. Four years of Champions League embarrassment. A lack of competition throughout the squad from disastrous planning. La Masía being overwhelmed with strange signings to balance the books. There are almost no positives from his time in charge.

Conclusion

Friday’s game showed a disgraceful performance by the players and the manager of Barcelona. There can be no excuses, and both must own up to their failings. Although, when looking at how it has come to this point, the board must take the blame too. Bartomeu’s time at Barça was always leading to a disaster. Nobody could have predicted it being so bad.

It is sad to see a club that prided itself on playing attractive football, its youth academy and love for the game abandon everything it believed in. The further the club drifted from its principles, the worse it became. Change is desperately needed, and this must come from people that understand what Barça stands for.


Our Social Media channels:
@BarcaUniversal, Barça A team coverage
@BUlamasia, La Masia coverage
@femeniBU, Barça Femení coverage

Football is the greatest sport in the world. There is no sporting event that is watched more and is as passionately followed. Any football fan should try and watch Barcelona to understand how football should be played. At Barcelona, football is all about keeping the ball, movement, passing and playing great football above all else. I am a Barça fan from Scotland and have been following the team for over a decade now. I have been lucky enough to watch possibly the greatest era on football ever, and hope it continues.

Advertisement

Analysis

Why the 3-5-2 can never be a long term option for Barcelona

Avatar

Published

on

Photo via Imago

Ronald Koeman’s greatest tactical revelation upon coming to Barcelona has without a shadow of a doubt been the 3-5-2 formation. Fully conscious of the frailties of the team in every department, the Dutch manager crafted out a setup with which the strengths of his players could be amplified, and their weaknesses quickly swept under the rug.

The full capacity of the setup was illustrated in the ties against Sevilla both in the league and the cup, against Paris in the UEFA Champions League, and in its full glory against Real Sociedad in Barcelona’s 1-6 annihilation of them. More than the results, the performances won back the hearts of fans. Barça were, as it seemed, back to their best, and not a single soul could deny this. Not a single soul, except perhaps Zinedine Zidane.

In the recently concluded Clasico, the Catalans endured one of their worst first halves of the season to date. Overrun defensively on every turnover, Barcelona’s seemingly airtight defence was reduced to rubble while their attack could neither get to nor could they make use of the ball. With that, their titles hopes, too, were damaged seriously.

In the second period, however, with the introduction of the 4-3-3, things changed for the better, and if not for some misfortune in the final seconds of the match, the comeback would have been completed. In this article, Barça Universal explores the identity crisis within the club, the setup’s unsustainability and the inevitable complacency that awaits the team should the formation overstay its welcome.

The lack of cohesion with club institutions

Formations are, after all, nothing more than telephone numbers; or at least that is how Pep Guardiola sees it. While this is true in principle, it is a train of logic that only applies to a certain extent.

It certainly makes a difference when one has four midfielders in comparison to when one has three, and the number of centre-backs, while a seemingly irrelevant figure, has a panoply of consequences on the shape of the team long term. The way the first team sets itself up is a reflection of what will trickle down to the academy level, but with a club that seeks a distinguishable identity from the ground up, should it not be the other way around?

Barcelona, as a football club, have the luxury of boasting one of the best academies in world football, La Masia. From the Pre-Benjamín to the Juvenil and all the way to Barça B, the academy players are inculcated with a strict set of values, intricately detailed roles with pertinent information for each position one can take up once they get to the end game, which is, for every academy player, to play for the first team.

All levels in the La Masia deploy a formation similar to the 4-3-3. (Photo via Imago)

The maintenance and furtherance of this school of thought and football ensure ease of integration into the first team, almost indifferent of age. Why so? This is due to the fact that a winger, for instance, at the tender age of 16 — while certainly inexperienced in the highest level — has all the necessary principles of what is expected of them in the big stage deeply rooted in his veins.

With coherence in the running of the club, from the academy level all the way to the first team, players have absolutely no need to be integrated into the first team. Everything that they need to do, they a priori already know, and will lead to them sailing ever so smoothly into a first-team spot. This is why players such as Ansu Fati and Oscar Mingueza have succeeded, where Nelson Semedo and Arda Turan have not.

This, of course, doesn’t mean that every single academy graduate will succeed, but merely that their presence will infinitely be of utmost utility to the club — as long as the happenings in the first team foster an environment for them to succeed in.

Most teams, as part of the La Masia, use the 4-3-3 to integrate players. This simply means that if ever a formation such as the 3-5-2 or the 3-4-3 is to be used at the club, it should not be for extensive periods of time. It renders an entire academy structure useless, and this then translates to club presidents having to spend ludicrous amounts of money to acquire players that will simply not be needed once the team eventually reverts to the core values it upholds.

Unsustainability in the face of change

If at all anyone desires to know to what extent the 3-5-2 — or any of its variants — is sustainable over the long term, one need only ask one question: Should Ronald Koeman be sacked right this instant, what formation is his successor — perhaps García Pimienta, or Xavi — going to implement once he arrives at the club?

A staunch believer in Barcelona’s core values both in style and in ethics, the Spaniard is most certainly going to revert to the 4-3-3. It is what he has known all his life, and also what the youth he trains have been instilled with over the course of their journey into first-team football. Why change what never once needed fixing?

The use of a 3-5-2 needs particular transfers to be made in order for it to be used to its highest level: a pair of strikers, a set of wingbacks, an attacking midfielder, perhaps a libero, an attacking midfielder and a double pivot. While not a complete representation of the needs of the setup — one whose use varies from manager to manager —, this is a general overview of what the 3-5-2 demands and the 4-3-3 does not.

Koeman’s 3-5-2 was a brilliant temporary fix. (Photo via Imago)

Much like it would have a negative knock-on off on the academy for the fact it does not major in these specific positions, the sheer lack of durability of the setup will be put to show once the reverse is done and the team reverts to a back four. Suddenly the team will be in need of one positional pivot, a single central striker and interiors where the attacking midfielder would be of most use.

Knowing that Barcelona as an entity simply can not keep up with this particular setup for a year, let alone three, then it stands to reason that such a setup be used only for particular circumstances rather than be a regular occurrence at the club.

Inevitable complacency

The centre-backs

Ronald Koeman’s adoption of the back three was born out of one desire; to mask the flaws of previous systems. As Barcelona came to learn following Ernesto Valverde’s tenure, putting stop-gap solutions to long-standing problems is anything but desirable, as rather than put an end to a present-day problem, all it does is stall the defence’s eventual downfall by a couple of weeks or months.

The back three masks a panoply of positional issues within the players. As has been the case with both Oscar Mingueza and Frenkie de Jong, the back three system allows one centre-back to make runs into the attacking half of the pitch. This liberty stems from the fact that regardless of what one does upfront, they are going to be covered by the remaining two centre-halves.

Not the best idea for an young CB like Mingueza. (Photo via Imago)

Additionally, most modern teams prefer to set up with a single striker. It becomes almost too easy for a backline of three to deal with a single striker pressing them or making runs between the lines. And unless you have a midfield such as Marco Verratti, Idrissa Gana Gueye, Leandro Paredes, the forwards cannot afford to stay up and pin the CBs. 

In La Liga, the go-to formation is the 4-4-2. More often than not, the two furthermost players tend to stay at a certain distance from one another, with one fixated on the centre-backs while the other rests deeper in the pitch. Given the relatively low need to stay in one’s own defensive half, one of the players in the defensive trio could easily abandon his post and embark on his own missions in the opposition half. This has happened on more than enough occasions with Mingueza, even with Sergino Dest acting as the wingback.

Thanks to heroics from Marc Andre Ter Stegen, problems pertaining to his centre-backs’ positional negligence has been mitigated, but not for much longer. Relying on the goalkeeper to cover up for their inadequacies is nothing more than a means to an end. It is their job to make saves, however, this should not now become an excuse for future complacency.

For young centre-backs like Ronald Araujo and Mingueza, this is far from ideal. Eventually, they will have to move away from a three-man system which is bound to cause trouble in paradise. 

The sages once coined that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and there are several concrete examples to further this theory. One need only look at David Luiz’ career to get a glimpse at the long term negatives of the pursuit of a back three. Throughout his career, the Brazilian has been marred by defensive issues. His overall decision making, positional awareness and his ability to mark attackers have often been permeated with his dreadful inconsistency and woeful uncertainty.

Luiz’s career has been a defensive tragedy since 2013. (Photo via Imago)

Offensively, Luiz is a sight for sore eyes. His prowess in attack, owing to his pristine ball control, reliability under pressure and impressive passing range are rather impressive for a centre-back. Despite this, the fact that one would constantly need to have two near him for him in order for him to excel speaks volumes about his defensive ability. If anything, it was Arsenal’s 3-0 mauling of Chelsea in the Emirates back in the 2016/17 season that pushed Antonio Conte into making the switch to a back-three.

This example, and many others, illustrate the detrimental effects of a back three to the unit itself. It is a method in which a team can shoot itself in the foot. It fosters complacency in defence, and what for?

The wingbacks

Koeman has spoken highly of Jordi Alba in the past, and this season, the Spaniard has been revitalised. This has been one of his individual best offensive seasons in a Barcelona shirt — he has five goals and 13 assists from 40 appearances this season to his name, averaging more or less a goal contribution every two or so games.

The same, however, cannot be said about his defensive abilities. It is his failings in this sector that have meant that rather than be considered the best left-back in all of Europe, he lags behind, and for obvious reasons.

Tasked with defending as well as attacking the left flank in conjunction with his wingers, the Spaniard has shown aptitude in only one of these things. He has, on far too many occasions in this and preceding campaigns, been caught out of position to the detriment of the team. The Blaugranas’ defeat to Athletic Club in the Supercopa final best illustrates his sheer defensive ineptitude. He recorded two assists, which on its own was phenomenal, but on the flip side, he gave away two goals as a result of his complete lack of positional and spatial awareness. He was just about as much a blessing in attack as he was a curse in defence. That is, up until the introduction of the 3-5-2.

Offensive powerhouse, defensive slaughterhouse. (Photo via Imago)

Koeman sees Alba as indispensable for the team, and as such, he shaped up the team in such a way that it would accommodate him regardless of how he would perform. Thus far, this ambitious project has borne fruit. The 32-year-old has since scored two goals as well as provided two assists in La Liga, as his newfound offensive privileges have relieved him of all his backbreaking defensive duties.

Much as was the goal with the centre-backs, this new system has been put in place not to remedy previous issues but rather to paper over the cracks. For all the virtues the system has, it has done absolutely nothing to improve Alba’s — or Dest’s — defensive capabilities but rather conceal them by use of the back three.

It should stand to reason that if a manager has to change a system because he is incapable of placing any trust in his full-backs to defend, which is after all the bare minimum they have to offer, then there is a dire need to stir up things. The American has shown on several occasions that he is dextrous enough to alternate between his offensive and defensive responsibilities with relative ease. The Euro winner, however, has not.

The attack

More often than not, teams that take up a three/five-man backline use two strikers upfront. There are issues that have a detrimental impact on the 3-5-2 as a general formation and others that affect Barcelona in particular.

Much like the centre-backs and fullbacks have a toxic and symbiotic relationship with one another, the strikers do too. They tend to be excellent when partnered up with one another, but not so much so as sole strikers. Sebastian Haller and Luka Jovic formed a formidable partnership when deployed together in such a system at Eintracht Frankfurt, but once put asunder, they immediately regressed. 

A predictable regression. (Photo via Imago)

The opposition defence has to leak outwards to cope with the wingbacks, and in the process, stretches the centre beyond help. Consequently, with as many as three central midfielders, one of them can afford to rove into the final third, after which it essentially becomes a 3v2 scenario in the centre. The strikers can then exploit this space. Atalanta did this by using Alejandro Gomez as the focal point, while Antonio Conte’s Inter Milan does it by pushing one of Nicolo Barella or Stefan Sensei up. 

Moving to a single striker system, then, becomes a lot more complicated because you are not given this kind of space in the attack. 

At Barça, there is an entirely different set of issues at hand. To start, the team has no true striker but rather a false 9 and a winger in the form of Lionel Messi and Ousmane Dembele, respectively. The Frenchman has suffered greatly in the novel setup. While he has been on the receiving end of innumerable crosses from his teammates, his sheer inability to make hay while the golden sun shone brightly upon him has come back to haunt not only him but also his team.

Bar his inability to bury chances presented to him, he is simply incapable of forming partnerships with his teammates. As a result, he oftentimes finds himself isolated, much like an outsider looking in. his decision making is just as woeful as it was before, but this time, as the last man, they perhaps carry more weight.

Messi and Dembele cannot operate in the 3-5-2 for much longer. (Photo via Imago)

This setup reduces wingers to ashes. The likes of Alex Collado, Francisco Trincao, could each lose a place in the team if at all this setup is to be used in the long term. No winger has a place in it, which is quite ironic given how much of Barcelona’s history has been shaped by players of that position exactly.


In and of itself, the 3-5-2 is not a horrible formation but simply one that will fail to stand the test of time. It is an excellent formation should one require a dangerous attack and a defence capable of covering up its flaws, but in the long term, it will collapse in on itself. Teams such as Inter Milan, good as they are, are ticking timebombs. A managerial change is always around the corner in this fast-paced footballing world, and should Antonio Conte depart from the Nerazzurri, then the current Italian leaders could see a majority of their squad turn to deadwood in the blink of an eye.

The onus is on Ronald Koeman and the current board to discuss the way forward. The 4-3-3 is, has been, and will continue to be the way that Barcelona will best play their football. The team needs reinforcements and pruning of unwanted players in equal measure wherever necessary.

Continue Reading